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Introduction:​ Terrorism is one of the most relevant and pressing challenges for 
sovereign nations in the 21st century. According to Rahman, on ​Rising Trends of 
Terrorism​, the current decade has witnessed some of the most severe waves of 
terrorism the world has ever seen (Rahman 410). Additionally, the last decade has also 
presented the global community with the largest refugee crisis since the Second World 
War. Many government leaders draw a correlation between these global trends, and 
more specifically, interpreting these trends has polarized decision-making processes, 
policies, and voting habits all across Europe. Outside of the Middle East, Europe 
accepts the largest number of refugees in the world and its proximity to Middle Eastern 
and North African conflict has made it a desired location for many individuals fleeing 
homelands of instability, violence, and war. According to a Pew Research Center 
analysis of data from ​Eurostat​, the European Union’s statistical agency, “a record 1.3 
million migrants applied for asylum in the 28 member states of the European Union in 
2015.” Some countries nearly doubled the “previous high water mark of roughly 700,000 
that was set in 1992 after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union” (Connor 1). Maria Do Céu Pinto Arena, synthesizes the correlation of the 
increases in both refugee flows and terrorism by describing how “the massive inflow of 
immigrants in Europe coincides with the rise of the so-called Islamic State and a spike 
of terrorist incidents on European soil driven by the war in Syria” and that the “growing 
numbers of asylum seekers fleeing turmoil in Africa and the Middle East poses complex 
challenges for European policymakers” (Do Céu Pinto Arena 7-8).  This perceived 
correlation has had an effect on rising European xenophobia, increased nationalism, 
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Islamophobia, racism and has caused many Prime Ministers, Presidents, and Heads of 
State to adopt (or consider adopting) more stringent immigration policies to the ends of 
providing stronger homeland security for their European citizens. These trends can be 
seen on a global scale as exemplified by American President Trump’s travel ban which 
was “​needed to give government agencies time to develop a stricter vetting system and 
ensure that visas were not issued to individuals posing a national security threat” 
(​Trump’s Executive Order​). Furthermore, the contentious French election of 2017 
involving Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen primarily rested upon candidates’ 
immigration policies. Finally, Great Britain’s vote in favor of leaving the European Union 
much depended on disagreement over the sweeping immigration standards for the 
European Union. 
 ​This research analyzes factors that affect the number of terrorist incidents in 
Europe with large numbers of refugees. Through my research, I intend to explore the 
correlation between refugees and terrorist incidents and to identify if social integration 
and immigration policies can have an effect on the volume of attacks. My independent 
variables of social policies in addition to immigration policies confirm my hypothesis that 
certain factors within these policies affect terrorism in Spain, the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, and Germany. The countries of study were selected based on a BBC News 
graphic depicting the number of asylum claims in 2015. Both Germany and Sweden 
have large quantities of asylum claims and the United Kingdom and Spain have 
relatively very few. These countries have contrasting quantitative data hence useful in 
my policy comparison studies. The World Bank data complements the data from the 
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BBC News graphic. The 
second graphic depicts the 
refugee population by 
territory of asylum in 2016.  
The sheer number of asylum 
claims as well as the 
numbers of refugees 
accepted exposes some of 
the differences in each 
nations’ immigration 
policies.  
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The research will be presented in two parts. I will begin by calling on the existing body 
of literature that links refugees to terrorism. This data is theoretically-based and will 
serve as the background for responding to the hypothesis. The section on the 
correlation between refugees and terrorism will be followed by individual assessments 
of Spain, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Germany. I will examine the data on their 
terrorist attacks since September 11th, 2001 and give an in-depth analysis of each 
country’s immigration and social integration policies. Alencar, from the ​European 
Journal of Communication​, describes the integration of refugees and immigrants in 
terms of economic, political, social, and cultural integration, but, “scientifically speaking, 
there is not clear measurement to determine when an individual is integrated into a new 
society” (Alencar 152). Integration can also be described as “negotiation between 
contexts and cultures, past and present, and country of origin and country of refuge, 
wherein identity is contested and constantly moving” (Bakker 119). Alencar elaborates 
on some of the challenges of defining complete social integration, but notes that there 
are certain strategies for measuring effective means or tools of successful integration. 
Some of these immigration/refugee policies will include, but are not limited to, 
assimilation strategies, living conditions, socio-economic support received, access to 
economic opportunity, access to the labor market, language training, educational 
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opportunities, accessibility/eligibility of welfare benefits and general treatment by host 
country. The research will finish by drawing a conclusion based on my results and 
offering public policy suggestions that decrease the likelihood of future terrorist attacks. 
The answer to this question will aid in the creation of stability, prosperity, and justice 
within Europe and provide a model for the rest of the international community. Initiating 
studies on this political phenomenon is crucial to reducing European terrorism, 
explaining some of its causes, preventing future conflict, and ultimately increasing the 
security of Europe’s citizens and noncitizens alike.  
It is imperative that key concepts are explained in my study. According to the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ​refugees​ can be defined as ​“someone 
who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war, or violence. 
A refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group” (UNHCR). This 
definition is not limited to asylum seekers which can be defined as a refugee whose 
sanctuary request which has not yet been processed. However, under the broader 
umbrella of ambiguous, transitional, or changing nationality, both immigrants, internally 
displaced persons, and stateless people will not be included in this study. Terrorism is 
also a complex concept to define because terrorism often involves the use of violence 
against civilians in in the pursuit of political gains; however, it is complicated because 
one nation’s terrorist is another nation’s freedom fighter or political activist. According to 
a definition adopted by the United Nations,​ terrorism ​can be defined as “any action that 
is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or noncombatants, when 
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the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to 
compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any 
act” (Terrorism).  
 
Literature Review:​ ​The topic of homeland security in Europe has been a 
pressing topic by many political scientists, administrations, and researchers alike. For 
example, Nicolescu’s article, ​“Current challenges of the European security caused by 
the refugee crisis. The EU’s fight against terrorism” ​addresses the main points of safety 
measures and border security regarding migration. Also, this source examines specific 
economic costs of achieving higher security in Europe. Nazli Avdan’s article is similar to 
Nicolescu’s in that European homeland security is its focus, but it is different in that it 
evaluates the effects of policy tightening. It responds to the stringency of policy and how 
“transnational terror shapes policy outcomes” (Avdan 445). Author Ian Bremmer, 
describes the ways that terror is affecting Europe and the political arena’s most recent 
shift to homeland security (as its most contentious and important issue.) Bremmer 
attributes flow of refugees into Europe as a direct result of the instability and breakdown 
of order in the Middle East. The European homeland security problem is ​exacerbate​d by 
Europe’s weak and slowly growing economy that is struggling to pool their resources for 
general economic growth and security measures. With heightened xenophobia in 
Europe and uncertainty in economic markets, Bremmer elaborates on the magnitude of 
the sentiment towards refugees and indicates that terrorism and homeland security will 
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continue to play huge roles during elections in France and Germany, as quasi-leaders 
of the European Union and beyond. 
Both McGilloway, Milton, and Sude elaborate on the patterns that can be 
observed from refugee radicalization. McGilloway investigates the “pathways and 
processes associated with radicalization and extremism amongst people of Muslim 
heritage living in Western societies” (McGilloway 39). She comes to the conclusion that 
local and external factors can increase exposure to radicalized behaviors in vulnerable 
communities. Like McGilloway, Milton too describes some of the the conditions or 
pathways that contribute to radicalization followed by transnational terrorism. However, 
different from McGilloway, Milton goes a step further to conclude that refugee camps 
and poor host state treatment contribute to the radicalization of refugees (Milton 621). 
Milton also answers the question of whether or not refugees are a direct cause in the 
spread of interstate, civil, terrorist conflicts, or general political violence. Like 
McGilloway, Sude uses his exact rhetoric of “internal and external factors” to describe 
causes for radicalization. Sude’s article is also similar to Milton’s in that it faults the 
refugee camps themselves for a portion of the radicalization process that can lead to 
future terrorist attacks. She writes that “in most cases in which refugees lived in 
geographically isolated, crowded camps, criminal activity occurred, and it was 
sometimes violent—” However, Sude’s paper cites other radicalization factors including 
geographic placement, actions of the host country, legal status, level of social and 
economic support, and the preexistence of militant groups in the area (Sude 2).   
Finally, Milton, Gerwarth, and Fine engage in dialogue regarding the direct 
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threats of refugee terrorism. These authors either de-link or link the large general 
questions of refugees and terrorism. Some authors give possible explanations for the 
linkages. Fine, author in​ "Security Practices and Resettlement"​ disagrees with the 
linkage between refugees and terrorism because she claims that “refugees are placed 
on a security continuum alongside transnational criminals and terrorists” and both are 
inherently separate entities. Milton contradicts Fine’s observations in the recognition of 
the link between refugee flows and transnational terrorism. Milton establishes a 
statistical model to help explain the relationship. Though the dataset acknowledges that 
correlation does not equate to causation, Milton concludes that “refugee flows do indeed 
contribute to a higher likelihood of terrorism in the host state,” but he develops his 
research further to examine that “most refugees are victims of violence brought upon 
them by groups and states” and also that his research “emphasized the possibility of 
terrorism arising from within refugee flows” (Milton 623). Milton’s article will be critical to 
additional independent research because this article seeks to understand the potential 
dangers of this specific link and offer policy advice to states in order to “better protect 
the countless numbers of refugees as part of a solution to the challenge of terrorism” 
(Milton 623). Gerwarth’s article,​ “Internationalising Historical Research on Terrorist 
Movements in the Twentieth-century Europe” ​is similar to Milton’s in that it does 
recognize “striking parallels” between refugee radicalization processes and international 
terrorist networks (Gerwarth 276). However, this article offers new insight to the 
historical records of terrorism in Europe. While the majority of these articles examine the 
political and social framework of Europe post-9/11, this article gives depth to research 
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providing “the longer history of transnationally operating clandestine violent movements 
in European history” (Gerwarth 275).  
Overall, the existing body of literature can be broken down into threats ​to​ and 
improvement ​of​ European homeland security, the pathways to radicalization, and ​how 
and ​if​ refugees have an significant effect on transnational terrorism. After examining the 
data, evaluating the results, and drawing conclusions, this paper seeks an answer to the 
question, ​do social integration and immigration policies have the capacity to lessen the 
risk of refugee radicalization and decrease terrorist activity across Europe?  
 
Research Design:​ ​This project analyzes the kinds of factors that affect the 
number of terrorist incidents in Europe with large numbers of refugees. Through my 
research I intend to explore the correlation between refugees and terrorist incidents and 
to identify if social and immigration policies can have an effect on the volume of attacks. 
My independent variables of social policies in addition to immigration policies will either 
confirm my hypothesis that certain factors within these policies affect terrorism in Spain, 
the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Germany.  
My dependent variable ​includes the number of terrorist attacks in United 
Kingdom, Spain, Germany, and Sweden. These countries were chosen based on a 
BBC News graphic which depicts the number of asylum claims in Europe by country. I 
chose two countries with high acceptance rates of refugees and two countries with low 
acceptance rates of refugees. The acceptance rates/ asylum claims of both categories 
expose some of the differences in their immigration policies. These differences have an 
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effect on their number of terrorist attacks. The political phenomenon I seek to explain is 
pertinent because terrorism is one of the most relevant and pressing challenges for 
sovereign nations in the 21st century. T​he intent of my study is to confirm the causes for 
some of these trends by examining if refugee and ​social policies will have an affect on 
the number of terrorist attacks in Europe. The answer to this question will aid in the 
creation of safety, stability, prosperity, and justice within Europe and provide a model for 
the rest of the international community.  
In order to conduct the study I plan to use the scholarly body of literature that 
links refugees and terrorism and explains some of the possible causes for the 
correlation. I also plan to use the University of Maryland’s​ Global Terrorism Database 
that breaks the terrorist data into categories of countries, number of incidents, 
perpetrating groups, and number of civilians wounded or killed. I will also look at a few 
descriptions of specific incidents in each country to have a deeper understanding of the 
individual attacks. Each country’s public information on their immigration statistics and 
policies will also provide the insight necessary for my study. The number of incidents 
will serve as my quantitative data but much of data will be dependent on the qualitative 
nature of social policy evaluation.  
Overall, this research explores if a link exists between refugees and terrorism in 
Europe and also if social and immigration policies can successfully decrease the 
number of terrorist incidents. According to Barbara Sude from the RAND Corporation, 
“risks grew with a package of factors: the geographic placement and legal status of the 
refugees, the level of social and economic support for local populations in those 
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locations, the preexistence of militant groups in refugee areas, and perhaps more 
critical​–​ the policies and actions of the receiving country” (Sude 2). 
Table 1: 
Table 2: 
Factors that make nations’ immigration policy unique within the context of the 
European Union  
 
Spain Nation’s reliance on NGO’s, 1995 Asylum Law, volume of 
refugee denials 
Great Britain Brexit, desire to remove ‘soft touch’ reputation, volatility 
Sweden  Volume of applicants, “most generous in the world,” measures 
taken for integration  
Germany “​world’s top destinations,” Angela Merkel, refugees with a 
specific link to terrorism, major magnet of migration 
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Examination: Germany 
This section of the paper analyzes Germany’s immigration and social integration 
policies for refugees. Within the context of the European Union, Germany is unique in 
that “German policymakers perpetuated the perception that Germany was not a country 
of immigration, even as it was becoming one of the world’s top destinations (second 
only to the United States in recent years). 1.3 million individuals applied for asylum 
claims in Europe in 2015 and Germany received the majority with 36 percent followed 
by closely by Sweden” (Rietig). Since the early 2000s, “Germany has undergone a 
profound policy shift toward recognizing its status and becoming a country that 
emphasizes the integration of newcomers” (Rietig). Another factor that makes Germany 
distinct from the rest of Europe is that Germany’s chancellor, Angela Merkel, has been 
an international beacon for refugee rights and ethical immigration standards. Known as 
“Chancellor of the free world,” Germany’s head of state is well-known for her viral selfies 
with refugees, her positive motto “We can manage” (​Wir schaffen das​) (in reference to 
the economic impact of refugees,) and being named​ TIME​ magazine’s “Person of the 
Year” in 2015 for her welcoming commitment to immigration. Her leadership during the 
one of largest refugee crises has confirmed the fact that Germany has “become a safe 
haven for those seeking protection” (Rietig). However, another factor that makes 
Germany’s situation unique is that there is an acute and recent linkage between 
refugees and terrorism. In 2016, a radicalized asylum seeker from Afghanistan attacked 
four people on a train and shortly following, a suicide bomber from Syria wounded five 
civilians at a music venue. These terrorist attacks have been specifically identified as 
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asylum seekers and the events have fostered extremely negative attitudes toward 
Germany’s response to refugees. Even with the Chancellor’s firm and humanitarian 
stance, Germany has become increasingly divided on the topic of immigration in recent 
months (Rietig). Despite recent attacks and changing attitudes, social and immigration 
policy under Merkel is still considered comprehensive and functional. Some legal 
benefits to refugees that enter Germany include new legislation that makes it easier to 
apply for German citizenship. Plus, children who are born to immigrant parents are 
given German citizenship if they choose to live in Germany for eight years (Rietig). 
Other legal measures include  “federally funded integration courses to teach newcomers 
German and provide them with legal and cultural orientation” (Rietig). Even while their 
asylum claims are being processed, refugees have the right to German language 
classes. A significant and unique characteristic of German society is their cultural 
commitment to volunteerism. When new waves of refugees arrived in Germany, 
hundreds of “ordinary citizens rushed to provide help where government support fell 
short” to provide food, temporary housing, medical, psychological support even in 
addition to “language classes, interpretation and job-matching services, homework help, 
and opportunities to get to know Germans through a joint meal, swim class, or soccer 
game” (Rietig). What also makes Germany an attractive location for refugees depends 
upon the relatively “easy access to the labor market” and with job opportunities, 
refugees have a “fast and low-threshold approach” to quick and automatic integration 
(Montgomery 159). Other benefits to refugees include state laws that mandate 
accomodations for “food, toiletries, clothes and ‘essential personal needs’ such as 
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telephone cards to communicate with family members back home” (Deutsche). In terms 
of access to healthcare, Frank Montgomery from the ​World Medical Journal ​describes 
that the German Medical Association made it explicit that every patient comes as a 
human patient under Hippocratic Oath and that “there is no such thing as an ‘illegal’ 
person in the healthcare system’ in Germany” (Montgomery 157). Individuals who seek 
asylum in Germany have access to Germany’s highly developed and highly inclusive 
healthcare system. In addition to citizenship rights, education, language training, and 
healthcare, refugees are also given housing. Most asylum seekers are able to live in 
their own apartments and no longer have to live in temporary shelters ("An Interview 
with Aydan Özoğuz”). Ms. Aydan Özoğuz, Minister of State and ​Federal Government 
Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration​ sums up Germany efforts for 
refugee social integration and immigration policies by explaining that “naturally, it is an 
enormous task to integrate hundreds of thousands of refugees, but the prerequisites for 
doing so are better than ever before in Germany, thanks to its strong economy and 
support from the public ("An Interview with Aydan Özoğuz”). 
Examination: United Kingdom 
This section of the paper will analyze the United Kingdom’s immigration and 
social integration policies for refugees. Within the context of the European Union, the 
United Kingdom’s immigration and social immigration policies are different from the rest 
of Europe in that the UK’s policies have proven to be the most volatile in the last few 
years; cause for such changes were initiated by the United Kingdom’s referendum to 
leave the European Union on June 23rd, 2016. Since then, policymakers, government 
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leaders, and executives have been working tirelessly to update existing policies, change 
the status quo, and begin all of the administrative tasks associated with independence 
from the European Union.  
Before the referendum, if an individual was granted asylum status in the United 
Kingdom, refugees were offered housing in the form of a host family, an apartment, a 
flat, or other types of government shelters. Individuals were offered 35.39 pounds per 
day in addition to dental care, eye care, and general healthcare. If refugee children were 
between the ages of five and seventeen, they were also entitled to an education 
(“Asylum Support”). Some other benefits to refugees included ​permission to reside in 
the UK for a ​temporary period of five years, the right to work, and access to mainstream 
welfare benefits (Glower 5). However, underlying these immigration and refugee 
benefits was a vocal public with a growing resentment of British immigration laws and 
standards. The British public has become increasingly concerned with “how historically 
unprecedented levels of immigration were impacting on the national economy, culture 
and the welfare state” (Goodwin 462).  
As a result, ​the refugee benefits were not realized as easily as the formal British 
policy suggested. Michael Collyer, author for the ​Forced Migration Review​ at the 
University of Oxford, expressed that “​disappointment and frustration with the limited 
opportunities to learn English were common to most resettled refugees” and this 
negatively affected employment opportunities and effective youth education. Also, 
schooling in native languages was often unavailable and English language education 
was difficult to access (Collyer 16-18). Lauren Bakker on ​The Asylum-Integration 
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Paradox​ concurs that even though resources were technically existent, there were large 
questions about the United Kingdom’s accessibility to them; “asylum seekers could, until 
2011, attend free language classes and further education courses, although provision 
was poor and waiting lists lengthy” (Bakker 122). In addition, housing was provided to 
refugees but they had no discretion on their location and the accommodation allocated 
to them was not paid for by the local council. It was nearly always “‘hard to let’ 
properties, where other people did not prefer to live” (“Asylum Seekers and Benefits- 
The Truth About Asylum”). In addition, “the UK either disperses asylum seekers to 
housing in deprived areas across the country, embedding them within communities 
where they frequently experience prejudice, harassment or isolation” (Bakker 119). 
Finally, in terms of access to healthcare, refugees in the United Kingdom have access 
to many healthcare sectors but with recent ​tightening controls on welfare entitlements, 
British healthcare providers declared that if individuals did not pass the initial stages of 
the asylum screening process, they would no longer be eligible for treatment in 
secondary healthcare (Reeves). According to the United Nations Convention on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights, in which the United Kingdom is a signatory, all 
individuals have rights “to the highest attainable standard of health” (Reeves). The act 
of making healthcare inaccessible to refugees shows that United Kingdom fails to meet 
this UN obligation (Reeves). ​Clare Feikert-Ahalt, on ​Refugee Law and Policy: United 
Kingdom,​ describes that “in an attempt to remove the perception that the United 
Kingdom is a ‘soft touch’ for asylum seekers and the public perception that asylum 
seekers are taking money away from benefits that citizens of Britain are entitled to, the 
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government introduced a number of controversial new laws. New legal codes in the 
United Kingdom provide that asylum seekers allow for administrative detention, limit the 
benefits provided, and enable benefits to be withdrawn if it is believed the applicant did 
not make a claim for asylum within a reasonably practicable time” (Feikert-Ahalt). ​While 
the legal framework appears to offer refugees the accessibility of integration and 
suggest quality social improvement strategies, it is clear that an underlying 
anti-immigration sentiment often prevents the legal body from functioning effectively. 
While the refugee benefits might appear generous in the UK, there are many 
misconceptions about the United Kingdom’s social integration and immigration policies. 
According to Eiko Thielemann, from Political Quarterly on ​Buying into Myths: Free 
Movement of People and Immigration​, “one often hears that migrants are attracted by 
the UK’s generous welfare system’ and British Prime Minister, David Cameron, made it 
clear that his government wanted to reduce the numbers of migrants coming to the 
United Kingdom and he stated that ‘we can reduce the flow of people coming from 
within the EU by reducing the draw that our welfare system can exert across Europe’” 
(Thielemann 141). Linda Bakker on ​International Migration​ re-emphasized this point 
confirming the fact that, “as a consequence of increasing numbers of asylum seekers, 
countries have witnessed the emergence of negative popular and media attitudes 
towards [refugees], with arrivals being portrayed as falsely claiming they had been 
persecuted in order to access housing, benefits, and employment, and in doing so 
taking advantage of allegedly generous welfare states” (Bakker 118). David Cameron 
voiced his desire to change the current immigration framework and the 2016 Brexit 
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referendum was a turning point in British history and the course of its immigration policy. 
The public voted to abandon their European Union membership and the referendum 
passed on June 23rd, 2016. Recent academic research on the Brexit vote indicates that 
immigration was the key driver in voting behaviors (Goodwin 455). David Cameron 
declared that immigration was “a top priority” and also that free movement of people 
within the European Union “has become the central issue of the British government’s 
renegotiation and referendum campaign on the UK’s relationship with the European 
Union” (Thielemann 139). Preceding the Brexit vote, Turkey’s EU membership was 
being considered within the European community. Much of the British public and 
government leaders believed that Turkey’s admittance to the EU would exert ‘breaking 
point’ pressure on Great Britain’s already-saturated public services for refugees and 
immigrants. Individuals who feared Turkey’s membership, had increasingly pessimistic 
attitudes towards Great Britain’s current immigration policy. They were concerned that 
high levels of immigration would hurt domestic jobs, reduce their quality of life, and 
threaten their national identity; these individuals proved most likely to vote in favor of the 
Brexit vote (Goodwin 455 and Reenan 35).   
Overall, the United Kingdom’s social integration and immigration policies may 
have seemed more inclusive before 2016, but with anti-immigration sentiment in tandem 
with a national referendum, Great Britain’s policies are becoming more restrictive and 
means of integration less accessible. S​ocial integration, socio-economic support 
received, and access to economic opportunity prove its highly restrictionist nature 
(Collyer 16). Bakker makes clear that “While two refugee integration strategies have 
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been published which stress the importance of refugee integration, the UK does not 
have a refugee integration programme (Bakker 123). ​Described by Derek McGhee, 
autho​r of ​The Paths to Citizenship: A Critical Examination of Immigration Policy in 
Britain since 2001, ​Great Britain post-Brexit continues policies that promote 
“non-integration, social exclusion, and economic marginalization” of immigrant and 
refugee groups (McGhee 42 and Collyer 16).  
 
Examination: Spain 
 
This section of the paper analyzes Spain’s immigration and social integration 
policies for refugees. Within the constructs of the EU, the Spanish immigration system is 
distinct in two aspects. First, Spanish immigration services are heavily dependent on 
non-governmental organizations. Secondly, Spain’s ‘Inadmissibility’ clause of its 1995 
Asylum Law includes an additional asylum screening stage compared to the rest of 
European screening process. Both of these characteristics are significant factors in 
Spain’s overarching immigration policy. Olga Jubany-Baucells, scholar at the ​London 
School of Economics, ​describes Spain’s reliance on extra-institutional actors to provide 
resources for refugees. Although the Spanish government is responsible for welfare 
financing and distribution, “NGOs and local administrations are the main providers of 
benefits to non-status asylum seekers” (Jubany-Baucells 416). While NGOs are crucial 
for organization and immediate relief of refugees, Jubany-Baucells describes that NGOs 
are often overwhelmed, over-exhausted, and consistently lacking resources. The 
Spanish NGOs are necessary but their services are often inadequate and underfunded 
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without the assistance of the Spanish government and formal Spanish laws. According 
to Steven Hook, NGOs are often characterized by limited resources, lack of formal 
contacts with governments, and a democratic deficit (Hook 287).  
In addition to dependence on NGOs, Spain’s 1995 asylum law established an 
‘inadmissibility clause’ which adds another asylum screening stage to the immigration 
process. Individuals must pass through this initial stage before their application can be 
admitted for stringent formal review. With the election of Spain’s conservative ​Partido 
Popular ​in June of 2016​, ​this inadmissibility clause drastically reduced the rights of 
those without documents (Jubany-Baucells 419).  
Spain’s welfare system is relatively new and was created only after the fall of the 
Spanish dictator, Francisco Franco, in 1975. This welfare system includes access to 
housing, social, educational, employment, and health services. These services are 
comprehensive and impressive; however, they are only available to working Spanish 
nationals. This poses a problem for refugees and people seeking to attain asylum status 
because, according to Jubany-Baucells, “over 90 percent of people who initially apply 
for asylum in Spain are not provided with state welfare” (Jubany-Baucells 425). Only if a 
refugee is a part of that remaining 10 percent can he or she be granted formal Spanish 
refugee status. They then have the opportunity to look for work and possibly be 
admitted to the welfare system. After the analysis of Spain’s immigration policy 
attributes and access (or lack of access) to social integration by the means of housing, 
socio-economic support received, and access to economic opportunity, it becomes clear 
that Spain’s immigration and refugee policies are exclusionary by nature 
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(Jubany-Bucells 420). In terms of accessing the job market, refugees have limited 
access to economic opportunity in the labor market in Spain. The Migration Policy 
Institute emphasizes that “new policies required that migrants seek work visas and 
residency permits only after any job offer and, further, made it exceedingly difficult to 
renew required permits” and also that Spain is “widely viewed of falling short of meeting 
labor needs” (“Spain: Forging an Immigration Policy”). Also, refugees in Spain legally 
have access to education, legal counsel, healthcare, permanent residency and an 
interpreter when dealing with governmental processes, but these benefits are only 
realized if the individual has been been granted asylum status. If individuals are denied 
asylum status, (as a large majority are,) individuals must leave Spain within a 60 day 
timeframe (“Spain: Forging an Immigration Policy”).  Alencar describes that problems 
related to Spanish host country hostility or exclusionary attitudes towards foreigners can 
significantly affect refugee settlement in the new society” (Alencar 162).  
 
Examination: Sweden 
This section of the paper analyzes Sweden’s immigration and social integration 
policies. In a European context, the Swedish asylum system is unique in that it has long 
been characterized as progressive, technically efficient, advanced, welcoming, open, 
and one of the most generous in the world (Frazke 8-11). Additionally, Sweden sets 
itself apart from its European counterparts by their sheer number of refugee applicants. 
According to Frazke, author for the ​Transatlantic Council on Migration, ​“between 
January and December 2015, Sweden received more than 160,000 applications for 
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asylum​—​ the highest number per capita in the European Union and the ​Economic 
Co-operation and Development​” (Hofverberg). To conceptualize Sweden’s immigration 
policy, the 71,000 population of ​Södertälje, Sweden, took more Iraqi refugees than the 
United States and the United Kingdom combined in 2005. Sweden also differentiates 
itself from the rest of Europe in that it was the first European country to grant permanent 
residence permits to asylum seekers from Syria ​(Hofverberg).  
Within the last two years, some changes have been made to Sweden’s 
characteristically fluid immigration policy. Due to the enormous influx of refugees, a 
housing shortage, and a teacher scarcity in Sweden, Swedish Prime Minister, Stefan 
Löfvan, expressed regret in his measures to tighten existing immigration controls. Some 
of these measures included document checks at the Sweden/Denmark border. Also in 
previous years, laws granted permanent residency to all protection beneficiaries, but 
today, that stipulation changed to a three-year residency permit that is renewable 
(Frazke 9).  
Despite the recent policy changes in response to the recent upheaval in the 
Middle East, Sweden’s social integration policies still prove to be the most welcoming in 
the world. Unlike most other European nations, refugees have access to housing, 
education, healthcare, and economic opportunities in the labor market, often times 
before they are granted official refugee status. According to Charles Westin, an author 
for the ​Migration Policy Institute​, Swedish immigration policy “was condensed into three 
principal objectives: equality, freedom of choice, and partnership. Immigrants residing 
permanently in Sweden were to enjoy the same rights as Swedish citizens including 
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access to the welfare system” (Westin). With regards to housing, the Swedish Migration 
Agency provides refugees with temporary housing assistance while their applications 
are being processed. In addition, special housing support is provided for 
unaccompanied minors or other particularly vulnerable individuals (Frazke 11). 
Education is a right as well as a requirement for refugee children in Sweden. Refugee 
children must be enrolled within a month upon their arrival and a refugee’s Swedish 
education includes a formal assessment of their educational background in addition to a 
tutor in their mother tongue if instructional support is needed to complete schooling 
(Frazke 18). Healthcare for refugees includes the ability to have a free voluntary health 
check after they file a protection claim, in addition to dental care and emergency care 
(Hofverberg). The Swedish government has a symbiotic relationship with nonprofits and 
NGOs that work at providing group therapy and support for refugees who come from 
situations with trauma or need mental health attention. Like the school systems, 
interpreters are provided at no cost to bridge language barriers in healthcare. One of the 
most defining characteristics of refugee access to healthcare includes a 12-hour 
civic-instruction session on the rules, rights, and procedures of Swedish healthcare to 
ensure that refugees are made aware of their rights to health (Frazke 21). The most 
significant benefit to refugees in Sweden is their access to the labor market. This is one 
of the most highly sought after benefits for nearly all refugees across Europe. Frazke 
sheds light on the fact that “asylum seekers have broad unrestricted access to the labor 
market including the ability to work immediately after arrival” and while their application 
is in progress, refugees are given training activities, internships, and language classes 
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(Frazke 16). Much of Sweden’s legal framework also favors the refugee population. The 
Swedish ​Aliens Act​ “allows for two additional forms of protection known as humanitarian 
protection;” this act grants more residence permits to individuals with extenuating 
circumstances or those who come from exceptionally distressing circumstances (Frazke 
3). Also, Sweden has significantly higher levels of legal naturalization than much of the 
rest of Europe (Thielemann 140). Sweden’s immigration and social integration policy 
ring true to its reputation of being one of the most inclusive in the world. In 2013, 50 
percent of applicants were granted refugee status and in 2015 that number rose to 70 
percent (Frazke 14). Housing, education, healthcare, and economic opportunities in the 
labor market are all accessible to that 70 percent granted refugee status. 
 Analysis of Sweden’s immigration policy and social integration through 
institutions of socio-economic support make it evident that Sweden’s policies are 
receptive to the communities’ needs and implementation of inclusive policies. These 
policies foster Sweden’s cherished values of a national community and a welfare state 
and also reaffirm that increasing contacts with refugees can enrich cultures and create 
deeper social networks through neighbors, friends, and family members that have the 
potential to benefit Swedish society (Eastmond 277 and Jubany-Baucells 428).  
Upon descriptive analysis of social integration and immigration policies across 
Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, and Sweden, the table quantifies the data below. 
The data is divided by countries and their means of social integration. Each country was 
given a rating based on a scale of 1-10. One represents extremely inclusive refugee 
policy and ten represents extremely exclusive refugee policy and their numbers were 
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based upon descriptive factors. The sum of each country’s categorical rating in the table 
was graphed below.  
Table 3: 
 ​Ratings for Social Integration and Immigration 
Policies for Refugees across Europe 
 
 Countries    
 Sweden Germany Spain 
United 
Kingdom 
Factors     
Access to Housing 4 3 9 6 
Access to Language Training 1 1 8 9 
Access to Economic Opportunity 1 1 10 9 
Access to Education 2 3 9 5 
Access to Healthcare 3 2 8 9 
General Access to Welfare 3 5 10 10 
Totals: 14 15 54 48 
Overall rating 1-10 (1= Extremely 
INCLUSIVE​ 10= Extremely 
EXCLUSIVE​)     
 
 
 
Table 4: 
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Conclusion:​ The results of this dataset are significant because the graph depicts a 
large range between the nature of countries’ social integration and immigration policies. 
The graph exhibits both Germany and Sweden with lower, or more ​inclusive​ policies 
whereas both the United Kingdom and Spain exhibit higher, or more ​exclusive​ policies. 
Taking average ratings of each group puts the United Kingdom and Spain almost ​three 
and a half times​ more exclusionary than both Germany and Sweden. While correlation 
does not equate to causation, it can be noted that the data strongly parallels the first 
graph which depicted the number of European terrorist incidents since 9/11. To explain 
further, of the four countries selected to study, both the United Kingdom and Spain have 
been affected by the largest number of terrorist incidents since September 11th and 
both Germany and Sweden have been affected by the fewest number of terrorist 
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incidents since September 11th. Taking averages of the two groups, it can be proven 
that the United Kingdom and Spain have had ​more than five times​ the amount of 
terrorist incidents than Germany and Sweden. To clarify, the data does not suggest a 
casual relationship but at best, is only a correlation. However, this study indicates that 
higher levels of social integration and inclusive immigration policies have the potential to 
decrease a country’s likelihood of experiencing acts of terror from refugee groups. With 
this conclusion, it appears that if refugees have better means of social integration, these 
refugees are less likely to commit acts of terror. More inclusive policies could have an 
inverse relationship with the number of terrorist attacks. While the question about 
refugee integration often remains a humanitarian issue in many political circles, it’s 
important to observe that strengthened social integration and broader immigration 
policies can have the potential to become a mechanism for the securitization of 
European nation states.  
While the data presented draws significant relationships between government 
policy and number of terrorist incidents, there were still many extraneous variables that 
could have had unintended effects on the results. The European countries selected for 
study were based only upon asylum claims in 2015; however, other variables might 
have affected the outcomes. Future researchers are encouraged to do a more 
comprehensive study that accounts for additional variables such as country GDP, host 
country’s governing body, population, geographic size, economy size, civic opinions, 
history of welfare systems, national unemployment statistics, and voting patterns: all of 
which that could have changed the conclusions dramatically. Another consideration 
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would include a more in-depth analysis of the types of terrorist incidents that were 
presented in the ​University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database​. Data showing 
terrorist incidents performed specifically by asylum seekers is often limited and unclear. 
Sude describes that, “separating fact from anecdote in evaluating historical cases of 
refugee involvement in terrorism is tricky. It can be hard to verify the connection to 
specific refugee populations” (Sude 14). Critical data would incorporate terrorist attacks 
specifically motivated by individuals frustrated by national policy frameworks. 
Additionally, country location and proximity to Middle Eastern conflict was a significant 
extraneous variable that was not taken into consideration in the study. The dependent 
variable was also constrained by a time limit including all incidents post-9/11 to the 
present and pre-9/11 incidents could have affected policies in place today. Finally, 
readers should note that there exists a gap in my research whereby radicalized 
individuals can only be measured by the concrete numbers of terrorist attacks. The 
study does not account for radicalization processes alone. There are no effective ways 
to measure refugee radicalization without understanding that evidence of radicalization 
can only be presented once the terrorist attack has been performed.  
All in all, present political rhetoric reflects walls, closed doors, and indications that 
increased inflows of refugees are a cause for increased terrorism. Yet, the study 
suggests a contrary relationship. Rather than a status as a foreigner forever, “​migrants, 
refugees and survivors of war must be given these tools to build status and become 
fully fledged members of society. Europe cannot afford another generation of 
radicalized youth being raised in its midst” (Singer). ​Successful, and more inclusive 
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European integration policies that lead to dignity, social interaction, economic 
development, better respect for human rights, autonomy, less passivity, and more 
cooperative relationships can offer solutions for safer futures with lessened risk of 
terrorist attacks.(Van Damme 1). Arthur Helton who was a member of the Council on 
Foreign Relations in 2002 articulated that “unless the rest of the world grasps the need 
of refugees for more than a fenced camp, the radicalism of the hopeless will continue to 
nurture terror and cause instability” (Sude). ​Finally,​ the the UN ​Special Reporter on 
promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering 
terrorism​, Ben Emmerson, outlined enthusiastically that  “the perception that terrorists 
take advantage of refugee flows to carry out acts of terrorism, or that refugees are 
somehow more prone to radicalization than others […] is analytically and statistically 
unfounded, and must change”. ​Instead, Mr. Emmerson confidently affirmed that 
“policies which respect human rights, justice, and accountability, and that manifest the 
values on which democracy is founded, are an essential element of effective 
counterterrorism policies” (​“Perception That Refugees Are More Prone to 
Radicalization”).  ​If nations can develop sustainable policies that foster building blocks 
for a better life, giving refugees a true stake in their new home, and encouraging 
participation rather than exclusion, it will turn what has so far been a crisis, into stability, 
prosperity, and security for Europe’s communities and beyond (Sunderland). 
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